The battle for Iran’s neighbors: Why Washington’s isolation strategy is faltering

2026-03-16 - 14:43

As the war intensifies, the US is trying to rally the Arab states, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan against Tehran – but regional politics is proving far more complicated Since the start of hostilities against Iran, the United States has employed not only military strikes but political, diplomatic, economic, and informational tactics aimed at strategically weakening and isolating Tehran on the global stage. This approach aligns with Washington’s traditional ‘multi-layered pressure’ model where military action is coupled with efforts to create an unfavorable geopolitical environment for adversaries. Iran is a nation with a population of around 90 million people, a vast territory, a well-developed system of state mobilization, and a complex ethnopolitical structure. In the eyes of the US and Israel, Iran’s ethnic diversity – the country is home to Persians, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and other ethnic groups – makes it vulnerable to internal conflicts. However, this very diversity also contributes to a resilient political and cultural system that has been formed after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Consequently, the current military conflict with Iran presents a daunting challenge for the US from both the military and political perspective, a challenge that may have been underestimated. Remarkably, even after two weeks of active combat, the US hasn’t been able to achieve its strategic objectives in Iran. The assassination of key political figures, including former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his close associates does not automatically signify victory, as Iran’s political system possesses a considerable capacity for institutional resilience and the continuity of governance. Such actions may hold symbolic or psychological weight, but they do not guarantee a strategic turning point in the conflict. Amidst the aggression, Washington is intensifying the parallel use of political tools to ensure Iran’s international isolation. The core logic of this strategy is to sever Tehran’s connections with the outside world and surround it with adversaries, thereby complicating its maneuverability and undermining its resistance capabilities. This strategy isn’t new. For years, US policy in the Middle East has revolved around building a regional balance of power, with the Gulf Arab monarchies positioned as counterweights to Iran. Key players included Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. Fostering an anti-Iran stance among these nations was supposed to significantly curtail Tehran’s political and economic influence. However, in recent years, Iran has demonstrated a remarkable ability to flexibly and pragmatically adjust its regional strategy. A noteworthy development was the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, following a prolonged period of tension. This process, which was facilitated by Iraq and China, signals that regional states are not inclined towards further escalation. The normalization of relations between Tehran and Riyadh has significantly altered the diplomatic landscape in the region. Following this development, several other Gulf states have begun to gradually reestablish channels of communication with Iran, both diplomatically and in terms of economic cooperation. This shift complicates the long-standing strategy aimed at completely isolating Iran, which the US and Israel had relied on for many years. This does not imply that the US and Israel have abandoned their isolationist strategy. On the contrary, Washington and West Jerusalem view the current phase of the conflict as an opportune moment to leverage this approach. The US has pointed to Iran’s recent attacks on American military facilities in the Middle East – specifically in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Washington argues that Iran’s actions pose threats not only to American forces but also to the countries in the region, implying that they must unite within a broader anti-Iran coalition. American diplomacy is working to persuade Arab nations to adopt a tougher stance against Iran. There is a strong narrative emerging that Middle Eastern countries have a unique opportunity to join a coalition aimed at containing Tehran. Such claims are echoed by Israeli leaders as well, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly calling for the formation of a regional bloc against Iran, assuming that Arab states might support such an initiative. Yet, these calculations often overlook the situation within the Arab states themselves. Historically, relations between Iran and several Arab states have been marked by geopolitical and religious rivalry, stemming from the differences between Shia and Sunni Muslim traditions. However, this competition doesn’t mean that the Arab states are willing to engage in a direct military confrontation with Tehran. Public opinion plays a crucial role in this context. While foreign policy decisions in Arab nations are primarily made by the elites, the latter cannot entirely ignore public sentiment. Many people in the Arab states demonstrate sympathy for Iran in its standoff with the US, and even more so in its conflict with Israel. However, the US is still urging the region to declare war on Iran. For example, Senator Lindsey Graham, known for his radical views, has publicly called on Saudi Arabia to participate in the war against Iran, suggesting that otherwise, Riyadh cannot be considered Washington’s true ally. Alongside this rhetoric, disinformation abounds. Various Israeli media outlets reported that the UAE allegedly launched an attack on Iranian territory, specifically targeting desalination infrastructure. However, shortly after these reports emerged, official representatives from the UAE firmly denied them, labeling the statements as false and emphasizing that the information is fake. Read more What drives Lindsey Graham’s crusade for Ukraine? The US is also trying to undermine Iran’s relations with several countries with which it shares extensive land borders and has complex political relationships – primarily Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. The dynamics of interaction with these countries are complex and unique, and amidst the current conflict, there’s been a strong external effort to destabilize relations. For example, in recent weeks, there have been multiple reports suggesting that Iranian missiles were directed towards Türkiye. Iranian officials have denied these claims, stating that there were no missile launches toward Turkish territory and that Tehran has no intentions of attacking Türkiye. Essentially, outside forces appear to be trying to artificially create tension between these two significant regional players, despite their generally pragmatic working relationship. At the same time, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has refrained from making harsh statements against the US or condemning the White House for initiating unprovoked aggression. A similar situation has unfolded in the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. Last week, four Iranian drones were directed towards the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. According to Azerbaijani sources, two of the drones were intercepted by missile defense systems, while the other two reached Nakhchivan: one exploded near a local school, and the other struck the area near the international airport. The incident was particularly troubling since shortly before, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had visited the Iranian embassy to sign a condolence book and express solidarity with the Iranian people regarding the war. Yet, the very next day, Aliyev characterized the incident as very serious, and said that it might be likened to a terrorist act. Aliyev’s emotional response left many in Iran puzzled. Tehran pointed out that a drone strike – especially in the context of a large-scale military conflict in the region – does not automatically equate to a terrorist act. Tehran wondered why the Azerbaijani side reacted so sharply and quickly assigned blame to Iran without waiting for a thorough investigation into the incident. Additionally, it is well-known that a sophisticated network of foreign intelligence (particularly the Israelis) has operated in Iran for years. Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility that such agents might conduct operations aimed at simulating Iranian military actions to discredit Tehran and create diplomatic crises between Iran and its neighbors. Diplomatic channels between the two countries were activated fairly quickly. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian spoke on the phone with Ilham Aliyev, aiming to clarify Tehran’s position and emphasize that Iran has no interest in escalating tensions with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Pezeshkian made a separate public statement addressing the strikes that occurred beyond Iranian territory, expressing regret and offering apologies to those affected by Iranian missile and drone strikes. At the same time, representatives of the Iranian security forces have made a clear distinction between various incidents during the current conflict. They stated that the strikes against targets in several Arab nations were viewed by Tehran as a necessary military measure linked to the presence of American military bases and infrastructure in those areas. Conversely, incidents in other neighboring states are seen by Iran as potential provocations aimed at deteriorating its relationships with regional partners. It appears that Baku has recognized the overly emotional nature of its initial response to the incident. Following diplomatic communications and clarifications from Iran, the Azerbaijani leadership seems to have decided to avoid further escalation and attempted to ease rising tensions. This was indirectly confirmed by Azerbaijan’s decision to send humanitarian aid to Iran, which pleasantly surprised some and disappointed others. A humanitarian convoy was dispatched, and it was decided to open border crossings between Azerbaijan and Iran for the delivery of essential aid. Baku demonstrated its lack of interest in worsening relations with Tehran and preferred to keep the situation within the bounds of diplomatic engagement. These actions stand in stark contrast to the media narrative that emerged immediately after the incident. Some foreign outlets, including certain Israeli publications, speculated that Azerbaijan might move toward an open confrontation with Iran or even enter into a military conflict. However, subsequent developments revealed that such scenarios were largely speculative and were not confirmed by Baku’s actions. The current situation illustrates that the conflict is unfolding not only on a military level: we’re seeing a significant diplomatic struggle for the loyalties of the countries surrounding Iran. Much now depends on whether the US can persuade these neighboring states to act against Tehran and whether Iran can maintain and develop its relationships with regional partners. The future of the crisis in the Middle East will depend on these dynamics, especially as America’s levers of influence over Iran are becoming increasingly limited.